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Dublin does not appear 
 
 
Before I begin, I would be grateful if you could give me the opportunity to make a 
supplementary introduction: may I take it as read here that when we refer to the “text” of 
architecture, we are making explicit reference to the Derridian “text”, that is, to the trace, mark, 
or ur-writing that he annouces in Of Gramatology: that writing which takes its authority not in 
secondary manner from speech (by which Derrida means, meaningful speech), but instead 
derives its authority from itself, from its own movement, that movement of differance which 
differs and difers from itself.  My demand is not that this be accepted per se, but rather that it 
be accepted as the milleau in which the following argument will develop.  And not only for the 
reason that Derrida’s thought developed explicitly out of a consideration of such writers as 
Joyce (Ulysses and particularly Finigans Wake), whose work he taught as a young English 
teacher. 
 
To begin, then, properly: my given task is to ask why, in Joyce, the city of Dublin as a place, as 
a worked series of pieces of architecture, barely makes an appearance.  And yet we feel, 
instinctively, that the book is about Dublin, keeping in mind the ambiguity of that phrase, that 
word “about”. 
 
In The Logic of Sense (section 33) Gilles Deleuze defines novelists/artists as “clinicians of 
civilisation”.  Great authors are more like doctors than their patients – in that, like great 
clinicians, they create a table or grouping of symptoms out of disparate symptoms.  To quote: 
 
  There is always a great deal of art involved in the grouping of symptoms, in the 
organisation of a table where a particular symptom is dissociated from another… and 
forms the new figure of a disorder or illness.  Clinicians who… renew a 
symptomatological table produce a work of art; conversely, artists are clinicians…. of 
civilisation.  It seems, moreover, that an evaluation of symptoms might only be achieved 
through a novel 
 
For Deleuze, this creation of disorders takes on a particular character.  In truth, for him, this 
table or novel is not created from “disorder”, since that would be to define the “chaosmos” of 
differences by means of the notion of order; that is, it would be to define differences in terms of 
sameness – something he had spent the whole of his preceding book, Difference and 
Repetition, refuting.  Thus the creation of a novel or table and its associated disorders can only 
occur within a field where originary difference has been proclaimed and acknowledged, and 
where every notion of the same or the one is derived from, or “said of” (as he puts it) that 
which always and from the start differs. 
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The exemplary novelist – Deleuze cites Joyce’s Ulysses, Proust and Poe’s Purloined Letter – 
disposes within this original difference two heterogeneous series of signifier and signified 
(section 6).  These two series resonate through a single homogenous series of names where 
each term can be seen to relate to the preceding one and the next one, thus: n1→ n2→ n3→ 
n4→….  The first name, or signifier, relates to the second name/signifier, relates to the third etc 
in the familiar continuous chain of signifiers.  But it is the novelist’s task to consider this 
homogenous chain instead from the point of view of “that which alternates in this succession” 
– ie the alternation of signified and signifier through the terms – and to allow these to resonate. 
 
In the case of Joyce, for instance, there is a series surrounding “Bloom” which is given as the 
signifying set; and a corresponding signified series “Ulysses”; between which the author 
establishes a resonance and relation by the various means of an “archaeology of narrative 
modes, a system of correspondence between numbers, a prodigious employment of esoteric 
words, a method of question and answer ad the establishment of currents of thought or 
multiple trains of thought”. 
 
In the case of Proust Deleuze says (in Difference and Repetition): 
  It is … a question of two series, that of a former present (Combray as it was lived) and 
that of a present present.  No doubt,…… there is a resemblance between the two series 
(that is, the madeleine, breakfast)… nevertheless the secret does not lie there. (p122) 
“Sunday morning 
at Combray” 
And, earlier: 
  Combray reappears not as it was or as it could be, but in a splendor which was never 
lived…  here, Combray reappears in the form of a past which was never present (p85) 
 
In the case of Poe’s Purloined Letter, Deleuze takes Lacan’s famous analysis of the serial 
structure of the story: 
  First series: the King who does not see the compromising letter received by the Queen; 
the Queen who is relieved to have hidden it so cleverly by leaving it out in the open (on 
her desk with other letters); the minister who sees everything and takes possession of 
the letter (to blackmail the Queen).  Second series: the police who, (searching minutely 
and repetitively) find nothing at the Minister’s apartment; the minister who thought of 
leaving the letter in the open in order to better hide it; Dupin (the Sherlock Holms figure) 
who sees everything and takes back possession of the letter 
Note that in this case, the letter circulates, inverted, through both of the series. 
 
In all cases, it is for Deleuze the differences between the series and their terms which “become 
[through the auspices of the author] primary”, not the resemblances. 
 
In order to see how these narrative series subsist also in a place or in an architecture, it is 
necessary to be clear under which ontology of “place” or “architecture” this can occur.  For 
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instance, under an ontology of architecture or place which posits that the nature of these as 
primarily material, formal or spatial, the attempt to see how Deleuze’s scheme is relevant will 
fail or result in nonsense.  This is because Deleuze is working within a stoic disjunctive logic, 
which he introduces in section 2 of Logic of Sense.  It is only via a reading which takes this 
logic into account that the narrative series could be said to be applicable to place and 
architecture. 
 
The Stoic disjunctive logic operates two distinct fields. 
 
On the one hand, there are bodies which have physical qualities, actions and passions – that is, 
these bodies includes not just inanimate objects but also our human bodies and those of 
animals; corresponding to these there are what he calls “states of affairs” – possibly making 
reference to the beginning of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus where it is stated that “a state of affairs 
(Sachverhalt) is a combination of objects”.  Deleuze states that the only time which relates to 
states of affairs, bodies, etc is the time of the present, and that only bodies exist in space.  
Finally, and perhaps most difficult to grasp, he states that within this field there exist not 
causes and effects, but only causes.  All bodies are causes, in relation to each other, but have 
no effects – as here defined. 
 
(To refer back briefly to the other possible ontologies of place or architecture mentioned above, 
it should be clear that a material, formal or spatial ontology would be placing these entities 
within this realm of “states of affairs”.) 
On the other hand, and disjunct from these “states of affairs”, is the field of which they are the 
cause.  The second field consists of the effects of the multiple causes of the states of affairs.  
These effects are what the above-mentioned (and certainly not invalid) ways of characterising 
place and architecture would tend to avoid, or not take into account.  They are, says Deleuze, 
of an entirely other nature to states of affairs.  These effects are not things or facts; they are 
“incorporeal entities” - events. They do not exist (this is something we say of states of affairs); 
they are nonexisting entities; rather than existing, they subsist, and in this word I think we 
should hear one of the traditional philosophical definitions of it, namely: something which 
occurs as a relation rather than as a fact.  As events, these effects are expressed by verbs; not, 
“the cut”, but rather “to be cut”.  In relation to time, they are not present or of the present, 
rather they are the becoming which divides itself in past and future and which always eludes 
the present.  (Deleuze’s distant reference to the question of the game, in the use of the word 
“elude”, would begin to link his ontology with certain other ontologies of architecture such as 
that of Gadamer – at first glance distant from this - which attempt to think it outside the 
Cartesian dualism of subject and object.) 
 
How do these disjunct fields relate “in practice”?  Deleuze, in a beautiful rendering in section 15 
of Logic of Sense, relates how the battle of war is the essential event: 
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  ….the battle is not an example of an event among others, but rather the Event in its 
essence…. because it is actualised in diverse manners at once, and because each 
participant may grasp it at a different level of actualisation within its variable present….. 
(And) it is above all because the battle hovers over its own field, neutral in relation to 
the victor and the vanquished, the coward and the brave; because of this, it is all the 
more terrible.  Never present but always yet to come and already passed, the battle is 
graspable only by the will of anonymity which it itself inspires. 
 
So this ontology would perhaps take the battle, the agon – and here again we see a possible 
link to the question of the game – as a primary reference in trying to think about the nature of 
place or architecture.  And we could also link this back not originally to a philosophical thought 
of Deleuze, but again to literature and the exemplary novelist: for I am pretty sure that this 
beautiful thought of the battle hovering over the battlefield comes from Scott Fitzgerald’s 
melancholy prose, where he speaks (of course) not of a battle, but of the manner in which the 
party (what else!) hovers over the ballroom.  (Scott Fitzgerald is as important to Deleuze as 
Joyce, Poe, or Proust.  Insofar as Deleuze takes some explicitly philosophical thoughts direct 
from him which he does not do with the others, perhaps more so.) 
 
More explicitly, we could quote Deleuze quoting Emile Breheir’s book on the stoics, where he 
speaks of the cut: 
 
When the scalpel cuts through the flesh, the first body produces upon the second not a 
new property but a new attribute, that of being cut.  The attribute does not designate 
any real quality….. it is, to the contrary, always expressed by the verb, which means 
that it is not a being but a way of being.  This way of being finds itself somehow at the 
limit, at the surface of being, the nature of which it is not able to change; it is in fact 
neither active nor passive, for passivity would presuppose a corporeal nature which 
undergoes an action 
 
To transpose this to, say, the city of Dublin, we could say that when we read the following in 
Joyce’s text: 
 
“A onelegged soldier crutched himself round MacConnell’s corner, skirting Rabaiotti’s 
icecream car, and jerked himself up Eccles street….” (224) 
 
the crippled body (and we know that for Bloom the status of the cripple is a complex one) 
produces on that first body, the material body of the city - it’s corners, its icecream vans - not a 
new property but rather the attribute of being walked through.  This attribute of the city is not a 
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“real” quality, but rather a way of being at the surface of being.  It is indeed neither active or 
passive, since this event can also be expressed vice versa – walking through the city of Dublin. 
 
And to simplify things still further by reference to Descartes, we could quote Deleuze’s first 
published work entitled Mathesis, Science and Philosophy, where he states: 
 
  …the knowing mind, as distinct as it might be in itself from the extension with which it 
appears to have strictly nothing in common, nonetheless deploys the order of things in 
thinking the order of its representations.  At the very moment where unity is affirmed, 
this unity breaks apart and destroys itself 
 
  But in being broken apart, Descartes now remarks, unity finds its true sense in re-
forming upon another plane, where it finds its true meaning.  In so far as the theoretical 
disunion of thought and extension is affirmed, so too is the fact of their practical union, 
as a definition of life.  Unity does not come about at the level of an abstract God 
transcending humanity, but in the very name of concrete life… the unity… is the unity 
of life itself, which delineates a third order, irreducible to the other two 
 
Now it would be gross to ignore the development of Deleuze’s thought over two decades from 
this 1946 text to that of Logic of Sense in 1968, but nonetheless it may be helpful to bear in 
mind that he points to the essentially analytical force of the Cartesian subject/object dualism 
which should in no way be allowed to determine the ontology of an “irreducible” life.  Life can 
be reduced – and for good reason - to the subject/object dualism, but the reverse cannot and 
does not follow.  You cannot reduce the subject object dualism to life, you cannot use the 
dualism to speak of life.  Perhaps the ontology we are speaking of can be summarised in the 
claim that place and architecture, thought in this way, is being thought about in terms of 
Deleuze’s  “irreducible life”. 
 
It is therefore this irreducible life to which one would make reference in an explanation as to the 
apparent disappearance of the city “itself”, its supposed material, visual, architecture or 
landscape qualities.  Joyce’s task is to explicate this irreducible life, this dual aspect of Dublin 
being walking through/walking through Dublin, and in so doing, in remaining faithful to a 
situation prior to any split between the subject and object, the objective qualities of the city and 
its architecture perforce remain in the background.  And yet the effect of this lack of 
foregrounding is perversely that the city is all the more present, all the more celebrated.  For 
can we point to a novel more clearly marked by a place; can we find a novel more obviously 
(and obsessively) celebrated by means of reference to a city? 
 
In this sense – the sense that it tends away from an explicit description of place -  Ulysses is 
the exemplary novel rather than an exceptional one, in contrast we might say to Robbe Grillet 
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whose peculiarity lies partly in the incessant stare of his work, the obsessive gaze at the fabric 
of the spaces in which the events slowly unfold.  This marks, too, the medium of film: Last 
Year at Marienbad. 
 
We could explicate this non-appearance of the city in terms of, say, Gadamer’s notion of the 
play of architecture (in his Truth and Method), whereby the ontology of the city is read via the 
notion not of aesthetics, but of the play back and forth between the inhabiter or participant in 
the city, and the city, its spaces and buildings, “itself”.  For Gadamer, taking his hint from a 
Heidegger-inspired authenticity (Eigentlichkeit), the exemplary moment in the city is not the act 
of looking at it, of theorising it, of photographing it or of – god forbid – being a tourist in 
relation to it.  The exemplary moment is that of the festival (and we could recall that in the 
past, as now, architects were intimately involved with festival construction) or, perhaps, liturgy; 
that is, those moments where the so-called material substrate of the city, its buildings and 
interiors, remains entirely out of focus, unthematised, for those who interplay with those spaces 
which give the festival its possibility.  On this reading, Ulysses would be festive: the raising to 
festival of the everyday life of the city, a movement whose genius is to remain at once 
celebratory and, at the same time, respectful of the mundanity of that which is being 
celebrates.  There is no resentment here; there is nothing of that which Deleuze characterises 
as true nihilsm is his early book Nietzsche and Philosophy, where he argues that Nietzsche’s 
notion of nihilism relates to those who deprecate our current, intramundane existance in the 
name of a transcendent and ultimately more valid reality.  Joyce revalues all values by abjuring 
all such nihilism.  Thus is his work a text, in the Derridian sense I spoke of at the outset. 
 
And this textual quality means, in Deleuze’s terms, that the inhabitant and the city each become 
simulacra of the other: they each turn back upon that which they appear to reference and 
therefore give us the situation for the first time.  That is, the architect/clinician/novelist operates 
to create and ramify new differences within a field which claims essential difference – 
difference as essence - not identity, as that from which all flows.  The architect/novelist is the 
one who stays true to Nietzsche’s eternal return of the same and to Deleuze’s thought of the 
“Dionysian sense-producing machine”; she is the one who does not merely dismiss the phrase 
“a machine for living in”; and in so doing, respects the following from Difference and Repetition: 
 
[The novel] opens on to the difference of Being by taking its own difference as object, 
by posing the question of its own difference 
 
We should perhaps expect no less, in turn, from the city. 